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POST-DISASTER SHELTER/HOUSING: THE STATE OF THE ART
Background
During HABITAT, a series of workshops were held devoted to the topic 
of emergency shelter and post-disaster housing.
Three key meetings were:
1. The Workshop on Post-Disaster Housing, June 2, HABITAT Forum:
The workshop, chaired by Jean-Paul Levy of UNDRO, consisted of 
a series of 20-minute presentations by persons working in the 
field. Discussions were limited to questions posed to each 
presenter.
2. The Carnegie-Mellon University/INTERTECT-sponsored forum on
Emergency Shelter, June 6, Gage Residence, University of 
British Columbia: This meeting, limited to persons actually
involved in emergency shelter work or research, was an open 
discussion of dommon issues and problems.
3. Ad hoc meeting of delegates, June 10, HABITAT Forum: This
meeting was called by the Guatemalan and Bangladesh delegates 
to provide an open forum to discuss common issues and problems, 
to discuss information-sharing, and to learn more about the 
developing role of UNDRO.
This paper represents a review of the issues identified at these meetings 
and a brief statement on the State of the Art as derived from the issues 
presented.
Major Issues
Relief in the Development Context: Much of the discussion at both the
Official Conference and the forum dealt with the growing awareness that "relief” 
programs cannot be regarded as separate and distinct from "development"
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programs. Various speakers underscored the interrelationship of the two and 
gave examples of how improperly run relief operations actually retarded the 
development process. As housing or emergency shelter programs are often the 
most costly —— and visible —  relief projects, they provide an excellent 
measure of the success or failure of various approaches and philosophies of 
relief. From the discussions, at all the meetings, it became apparent that 
the vast majority of organizations, including some of the''most advanced develop 
ment groups, lose their perspective following a disaster and concentrate their 
energies on delivery of items such as emergency shelter rather than on devel- 
oping or supporting social systems and helping these to deliver the necessary 
items. Once again, many field staff found comfort in the fact that"they were 
not the only ones to have experienced a high degree of failure in top-down 
approaches. I
What became apparent to all was the lack of professional assistance 
available to governments and voluntary agencies, especially at" field level, 
following a disaster; the lack of hard data on~approaches and projects in 
disaster relief; and the lack of a~central co-ordinating agency or information 
clearinghouse on disaster-related data pertaining .to the Third"World.* There 
was special concern that much of the effort and funding in disaster work is 
concentrated at the upper levels of" the international relief system; and it 
was universally felt that the upper levels are completely out of touch with 
the realities at the field level. It was felt by most non—governmental organi­
zations that there needed to be an extensive re-examination of the traditional 
approaches to both disaster relief and post-disaster housing.
* In fact, several sources of disaster information exist, notably the INTERTECT 
information-sharing program. UNDRO is currently setting up ah'information • 
clearinghouse; and Camegie-Mellon University is setting up a resource network.
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Defining Emergency Shelter and the Shelter Need: At each discussion on
post-disaster housing, the question of whether or not emergency shelter should 
be provided after a natural disaster received extensive debate. Vidyadhar 
Chavda of India (who surprisingly enough was winner of the UNESCO Prize for 
designing an emergency shelter system) declared that there was no such thing 
as emergency shelter. He and others pointed out that in a housing-deficient 
society, all structures become permanent, and efforts should be devoted to 
providing rapidly-built low-cost housing, eliminating al1 efforts at providing 
emergency or temporary shelters. Frederick Krimgold of M.I.T. and UNDRO, 
however, offered perhaps the best framework for deciding on whether or not 
emergency shelter is required. He pointed out that the issue can usually be 
decided as a function of the time necessary to build.a house under normal 
circumstances (which Incidentally Increases with the country’s scale of 
development). For example, in Bangladesh where people can normally construct 
a structure in a day, it is useless to attempt to provide shelters post-disaster,
i
as by the time they or the materials arrive, they are already unnecessary. In 
a more advanced society such as Greece, where the time required for construction 
of housing _is much longer,, some form of emergency shelter would be applicable.
The other situation In which emergency shelter is required is the refugee 
camp. If refugees have been evacuated from an area and cannot be absorbed by 
the local community or do not have formal access to normal housing resources, 
emergency shelter can be applicable.
Extensive debate focused on what form of assistance an emergency shelter 
program should take. While most agreed that use of indigenous materials was 
the only logical approach, there was considerable disagreement on how much 
technical assistance should be offered and how best to offer it. The Carnegie- 
Mellon design team painted outr that even in the high density refugee camps of
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Bangladesh, cultural resistance to new forms of housing limits the effective­
ness of the designer; and that even in the high exposure risk environments, 
a housing program —  as opposed to shelter —— must involve residents in the 
planning and execution of the project. Again, it was apparent from the NGO 
discussions that the normal development approaches cannot be discarded in 
emergencies. David Hopkins of Save the Children Federation/Community Develop-
ft
ment Foundation probably best summed up the discussions in his remark that 
NGO's and governments must stop viewing shelter as an item to be designed and 
built, and begin thinking of shelter as a process.
A peripheral issue to the question of technical assistance was. what-is- 
the proper .role of colleges and universities in providing help in post-disaster- 
situations? The Carnegie-Mellon team related how their program had undergone 
a change in approach from a design-oriented program to-one of research on 
methodologies and strategies for response. Ian Davis, a consultant to UNDRO, 
related the failures of college- and-competition-inspired emergency shelter./
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designs, and the helpfulness of in—depth studies such the the University.of 
Tennessee- study on housing-provision_af ter the Nicaraguan earthquake.—
It was generally agreed that the best role for colleges and universities is- 
to conduct research studies in such areas as housing policy,— land reform and 
land tenure issues, and to conduct case studiesof shelter programs. INTERTECT 
pointed out the difficulties in getting hard data on philosophies behind emer­
gency shelter programs, stating that-the majority of studies are analyses of 
structures, not programs.
Operational Issues
In all the various discussions at HABITAT, the following issues concerning 
post-disaster housing operations; emerged: ----- - ------
Evacuation: The evacuation of areas in the aftermath of natural disasters
was seen as a grave mistake by the majority of both delegates and NGO's.
Numerous field workers discussed the difficulties of re-establishing development 
following an evacuation and the difficulty of getting the much—needed 
qitizen participation going again. Many people who had worked in Managua after 
-^hs 1972 earthquake pointed to the problems of rebuilding the city due to the 
dispersal program. Australia, in its excellent film on Darwin, cited the 
evacuation as the single biggest mistake in its relief program. The fear that 
disease can be spread by the bodies of the dead —  a fear'that has often been 
used as a justification for evacuation —— was debunked:as a real threat by 
representatives of several disaster relief organizations. INTERTECT cited its 
^_mcent. work- in Guatemala, where some towns were evacuated and others began 
immediate reconstruction, as an example of the wisdom of the latter approach.
While all agreed that evacuation after a natural disaster should be 
avoided if possible, th(e official government delegations of many countries 
stopped short at condemning forced mass evacuations of slum and squatter settle­
ments. India and Bangladesh, especially, defended their forced removal of 
squatters into Bustee camps. (Bangladesh even went so far as to laud their 
own policies in their official HABITAT film.) These policies were brought to 
the fore during HABITAT by the actions of India in the attempted clearance of 
Janata Colony, a 25-year old squatter settlement in Bombay, to build a park.
The majority of NGO’s condemned the action and called it a man-made disaster, 
while a number of delegations supported the action on the basis of the govern­
ment s obligations to all the people to build a decent urban environment.
Refugee Camps: The main by-product of evacuation —  refugee camps —
was discussed at length. While nil agreed that they should be prevented at 
all costs, the reality of having to deal with them was rarely discussed. The
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Carnegie-Mellon team discussed its work on shelters for camps in Bangladesh; 
and INTERTECT touched briefly on its on-going study of refugee camps and camp 
planning techniques. It was agreed that camps are in fact very similar to 
squatter settlements, especially the Bustee camps, and work in the camps must 
utilize the same developmental approaches.
Infrastructure: Numerous field workers described the lack of adequate
provision of and attention to Infrastructure systems, especially water and 
sewage, in post-disaster housing programs. The case of housing being installed 
long before water and sewers were available was the rule, not the exception.
In a presentation to the Self-Help and Low-Cost Housing Symposium, Mrs. Yasmeen 
Lari of Pakistan cited the success of planners when adequately-reacting to the - 
community priorities in the provision of sites and services in reconstruction 
of a sector of flood-stricken Karachi; while the failure to so react was cited 
in films by Mauritius and Greece as a prime reason for large-scale housing 
projects remaining vacant in the aftermath of their disasters.
i
Salvage and Rubble Clearance Following Disasters: - Several challenges to 
the traditional-response of governments in immediate clearance:of rubble were -- 
offered at HABITATS.,-Carlos Santos, an engineer.-working_-in-Managua„following- _
the earthquake, cited the need for governments to go slowly and give people 
time to salvage all their building materials. He noted that millions of 
dollars worth of valuable materials were bulldozed and dumped into the lake, 
thus depriving the very poor of critically-needed building resources. INTERTECT 
supported his arguments by noting that the reason that structures collapse is 
rarely because of failure of the materials, but rather because of the way in 
which they have been used. Santos stressed that most clearance should be done 
by hand to maximize the recapture of salvageable materials.
7Community Disaster-Response Mechanisms: Various discussions centered on
the ability of most societies to respond themselves to disasters. A. A. Sultan 
(an Egyptian currently with the Graduate School of Architecture, University of 
Tokyo) pointed out that most communities have both formal and informal mech­
anisms which respond to disasters. There is a great danger in not recognizing 
and building on these mechanisms, for not only can an opportunity to facilitate 
delivery be lost, but the mechanisms themselves can be destroyed by an outside— 1 
directed relief operation. It is necessary to solve the problem of how to 
relate outside help to the built-in mechanisms of a society; i.e., how can we 
encourage this collective response? It was agreed by all the NGO’s that not 
enough data is currently available on these mechanisms and how they-work. _
Change. A number of discussions revolved around the question of how much ~ ~  
change can be introduced following a disaster. While all agreed that a disaster 
presents an excellent time to introduce change in settlement patterns, con­
struction techniques and structural improvements, the question of how much 
change can reasonably be expected and how to best effect this-change evoked- - ' 
a wide range of responses. Many representatives of voluntary agencies.;and - 
delegates felt that people should-be provided'with new,-safe housing-which 
would represent a substantial improvement over-the previous“unit. Many field 
workers challenged this approach, however, noting that for real change to occur, 
an atmosphere for change must be created first; changes are then introduced 
slowly, gradually building people’s acceptance of change. Ron Sawyer of 
Save the Children Federation/Community Development-Foundation -related how this 
approach was used following the earthquake in Guatemala —  how people there 
were taught to rebuild their homes in an extensive training program where 
simple changes were introduced slowly, getting the people used to the changes, 
then expanding the program gradually to encompass larger and larger objectives, -
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at governmental level before a disaster or at the field level after a disaster —  
was heavily debated. . UNDRO and most of the official delegates felt that if 
more resources (money) are devoted to the preventative measures (not to be 
confused with preparedness), the disaster-prone countries could cut their 
losses. But a vocal minority of NGO's challenged this assumption. They noted 
that many of the factors most necessary to making pre-disaster planning 
effective are issues of development, such as land reform —  issues to which 
existing governments and institutions have consistently failed to respond, 
usually because of vested interests. They pointed out that even if a country 
wants to change, it usually doesn’t have the funds, the legal framework or 
the~human commitment until a disaster strikes. They argued that the emphasis 
should be placed on developing methods of building in disaster prevention 
during the reconstruction, i.e., take advantage of the impetus to change when 
it is at its highest peak. Those opposed to this approach countered by saying 
that things are too disorganized after a disaster to institute these changes.
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This statement was challenged in turn by noting that organizations and committees 
set up following disasters are often more effective than their pre-disaster- 
counterparts ,' and that “many organizations operate more effectively in providing 
goods and services on a crisis basis. Furthermore, the emergency powers granted 
to many disaster relief committees enable them to slash through red tape.
All agreed, however, that more emphasis should be placed on pre-disaster 
planning at all levels, and that measures of pre-disaster planning should be 
incorporated into all national development plans.
—  - State of the Art: All the discussions and issues which were debated at -
HABITAT seem to prompt a brief„discussion on the current state of the art in 
the newly-emerging ’’discipline” of post-disaster housing. Perhaps the best 
“framework fo-r-explaining ~±t-Is-offered by a team of UNDRO consultants who are
preparing a study of emergency shelter provision.
They point out that a disaster can be defined as a temporary gap in the 
continuum of normal housing; but unlike other gaps, the actions conducted 
during the disaster affect what' normal housing becomes when the gap is closed.
In order to develop appropriate responses to close the gap (i.e. emergency shelter, 
temporary housing or rapid reconstruction of permanent housing), it is necessary
ito understand two things:
1. What strategies are available for closing the gap? There are three 
generally accepted strategies. First, the performance of normal 
housing can be extended, mainly through pre-disaster planning and 
disaster preparedness- programs .—— Second, a variety of temporary 
solutions can be used to fill the gap, such as emergency shelters 
or temporary housing. And last, the gap can be filled by rapid 
reconstruction of normal or improved temporary housing.
2. What factors control the gap? - Several of the factors are 
"repeaters” *in each disaster, but each-is unique in every situation. _ 
Factors include such things as uncertainty in the.refugee population, 
availability of financing, market—instability "(inflation), cultural 
acceptance of new housing types or styles, availability of materials, 
etc.
In order to understand the strategies and factors, it is necessary to 
know what "normal" housing was before the disaster. A complete understanding 
of housing form, building sequences, financing, settlement patterns, and other 
issues must be gained in order to predict what degree of change can be reason­
ably expected when a return to normal is effected. The failure to comprehend 
this is the largest single cause of delivering an inappropriate response.
10.
Approach
REPORT ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE CARNEGIE-MELLON/INTERTECT EMERGENCY SHELTER 
TEAM RELATED TO DEVELOPMENT OF AN APPROACH AND METHODOLOGY FOR EMERGENCY SHELTER
Introduction
In June, 1977, U.S. A.I.D. contracted Carnegie-Mellon University to 
continue its work in the development of prototype designs for emergency 
shelter units for disasters in developing countries. As a part of the 
contract, the team was asked to explore the possibilities of conducting 
research into the provision of emergency shelter following natural disasters. 
(Heretofore, the team had concentrated only on man-made disasters.) A 
major part of the study was to include a review of strategies and approaches 
to the provision of emergency shelter and post-disaster housing, and the 
contract called for the development of a framework in which foreign donors 
could examine the options and strategies which were available in the provision 
of emergency shelter.
At present, there are several studies which are currently being con­
ducted on not only the question of the provision of emergency shelter but 
also other forms of disaster assistance, and the members of the Carnegie— 
Mellon/INTERTECT team were able to benefit from these studies as well as 
contributing their own findings to them. The most important of these studies 
are the United Nations Disaster Relief Office Emergency Shelter Study and the 
Committee on International Disaster Assistance of the National Academy of 
Science. (Appendix A lists the addresses of the aforementioned studies and 
lists the materials available as a result of those studies.)
The team felt that it was necessary to fully understand the various 
strategies and approaches employed in the provision of emergency shelter 
before developing an approach and strategy of its own. A review of the 
activities of the voluntary agencies and foreign governments in emergency 
shelter shows that few of these groups actually have adopted sophisticated 
strategies and approaches per se, but many, in fact, do conduct repetitive 
or similar activities each time a disaster strikes, and therefore, the 
similarities between the programs allow them to be classified as they are 
this report. The classification of the programs as such provides 
a framework wherein the performance of the approach or strategy can be 
examined and also helps to identify problems or problem areas which can 
be expected to be encountered when selecting this approach or strategy.
The team has worked to identify the weaknesses which are inherent within 
these areas as well as the major gaps in the shelter and housing response 
system. In the work for the next two years, the team will address these 
problem areas and attempt to fill the gaps.
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I. Review of Strategies Employed by Intervenors
Following natural disasters, wherein a large number of the preexisting 
housing units have been destroyed or substantially damaged, relief agencies 
and other intervenors have usually chosen one or more of the following strategies 
to provide shelter and housing for the victims.
A. Emergency shelter.
Many agencies, especially those who consider themselves only relief 
agencies, adopt the strategy of providing an emergency shelter unit to provide 
housing to the victims until such time as they can rebuild normal housing. In 
cases where there is an expected environmental risk to the victims due to 
the climate or seasonal conditions, emergency shelter units often receive 
a fairly high priority on the part of the intervenors in purchasing and 
shipping these units. At this point, the emergency shelter is basically 
a humanitarian consideration; the long-term impact of the shelter units 
are not considered, and questions of cost-effectiveness normally do not 
come into play.
The record of the performance of emergency shelters and the role in 
which they play during the actual emergency period is currently being hotly 
debated. The evidence provided in the UNDRO study on the performance of 
donor provided emergency shelters shows:
1. They have little positive effect on alleviating conditions 
in the disaster area. The times when emergency shelters 
can be employed after a natural disaster with any effective­
ness appear to be extremely limited.
2. The majority of foreign intervenors have concentrated on 
designing emergency shelter units which can be quickly 
erected and can be flown from the donor country to the 
disaster area in a short period of time and in large volume.
The problem, however, does not lie in moving the units
to the disaster area nor in getting them quickly erected, 
the main problem is distribution of the units within the 
disaster area.
3. The evidence indicates very few of the emergency shelter 
units serve the purpose for which they were intended, in 
other words, life support or protection from the elements.
The uses of the shelter units by the victims have normally 
been a secondary use, such as storage of goods, household 
articles, or animals.
4. The vast majority of shelter following a disaster has been 
provided by the refugees themselves. Even in cases where 
the emergency shelter units have been erected, most have 
arrived and been erected long after the emergency period.
5. In the few cases where the shelter units have arrived during 
the actual emergency, they have usually been employed in the 
construction of refugee camps. The evidence indicates that
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the creation of refugee camps following natural disasters 
has a negative impact and creates long-term problems. The 
employment of emergency shelter units from the outside 
forces relief officials to adopt hastily conceived plans 
for distributing and erecting this influx of units. If 
they arrive immediately following the disaster, shelter 
units will receive a low priority (as compared to medical 
and sanitation needs), and, therefore, a shelter program 
will not receive the full attention that it needs. This 
encourages wastefulness and poorly planned distribution 
programs.
There are times, of course, when emergency shelter units are needed, but 
the evidence is overwhelmingly in support of its provision by the local 
government. If agencies wish to conduct emergency shelter programs, the time 
to begin conducting them is before the disaster occurs. In other words, 
areas in which a high risk exists and areas in which the structures are 
vulnerable to disaster should be identified, and emergency shelter units 
appropriate to the climate and environment can be placed in the proximity 
and distribution plans worked out in advance. Several countries, notably 
Turkey, have already undertaken steps along these lines.
B. Temporary Housing.
The temporary housing strategy is one normally undertaken By governments 
because the cost of providing temporary housing is so immense. The difference 
between temporary housing and emergency shelter is that the unit provided 
is expected to be a house which will last for a period of several months 
to several years and is intended to be erected on the site of a victim’s 
previous house. The philosophy behind a temporary housing strategy is that a 
low-cost, temporary unit can be provided at little or no cost to the 
disaster victim, and he will be able to live in it long enough to obtain 
the capital necessary to rebuild a normal permanent house. Temporary housing 
programs are normally used when damage covers very large areas and governments 
feel that it will take years to rebuild normal housing due to a shortage of 
capital and/or materials.
The main problem of the temporary housing strategy is the cost of the 
"temporary" units which are provided is often more than a permanent structure, 
especially when the disaster victims normally build their own houses from in­
digenous materials. In Guatemala, the government purchased large numbers of 
small, prefabricated structures at a cost of between $300 and $600 apiece. They, 
in turn, offered these to the public through the co-ops at half price($150-200). 
It was expected that the people would purchase the houses and live in them 
through the rainy season, and, six to nine months later, would rebuild 
permanent structures. The problem was, however, that a normal house only 
costs between $50 and $150 and provides upwards of three times the space of 
the temporary house. The people refused to buy the houses because they were 
too costly, and the government program of very long-term, low-interest payments 
still did not interest sufficient numbers of people in buying the units.
In those cases wherein temporary units are provided at a cost which is 
affordable or attractive to the disaster victims, the temporary houses may
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receive a wider distribution. However, a review of those instances where 
such units have been provided show that the houses are rarely used only on 
a temporary basis, that, in fact, they become long-term structures. Units 
provided in Peru following the earthquake in 1971, for example, are still 
in use. Rather than encouraging rapid reconstruction, the units usually 
inhibit more permanent and more formal structures.
C. Accelerating Reconstruction of Permanent Housing
Following several recent disasters, a number of agencies have developed 
a new strategy. Instead of attempting to provide emergency shelter or 
temporary housing, they have concentrated their resources on trying to 
encourage rapid reconstruction of normal housing. This approach —  which only 
works following a "single event" disaster such as a flood, earthquake, hurricane, 
or the cessation of hostilities following a war —  assumes that people will 
look after their own emergency shelter or temporary housing needs and allows 
the agencies to put the emphasis on restoration of the normal housing process 
as soon as possible.
In this approach, houses may be rebuilt to the normal standard following 
a disaster in which the houses themselves did not fail, such as in a flood 
or in a war. Reconstruction to an improved standard would occur following 
a disaster in which the houses failed as a result of inherent weaknesses of 
the structures, for example, following an earthquake.
The rapid reconstruction approach requires that the people have access to 
the normal housing process and markets. They must be able to obtain the 
materials they need for reconstruction and the services which are normally 
available within the community. As the majority of reconstruction activities will 
be carried out in self-help housing programs, reconstruction to an improved 
standard must concentrate on introducing the techniques of improved construction 
at a technological level consistent with the community and at a price which 
they can afford.
The advantages of using this approach are as follows:
1. It enables limited resources to be concentrated where they 
will have a permanent effect, and is thereby extremely cost ef­
fective .
2. It reduces the time during which people are without a full, 
formal houses, and thereby facilitates the rapid return
to normalcy.
3. As this strategy requires the use of a self-help housing approach, 
it keeps the houses at a price affordable by the local people
and allows the decision-making to be kept at an individual level.
4. Because it requires the use of a self-help housing approach, costs 
to the individual family may be reduced.
5. This strategy uses and builds upon the existing housing process 
and the skills which exist in the community.
Generally, there- are no major disadvantages to using this strategy, but 
it does require a willingness on the part of the government to assist by 
reducing the natural obstacles in the normal housing process and a long-term 
committment on the part of the intarvenor. Assistance can be in the form
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of price controls, low interest loans, etc. It also may require the local 
government to address some issues which it does not want to address, such 
as land reform. The approach should only be carried out where people are 
not living in vulnerable locations.
Of all the strategies available for reconstruction after a single-event 
disaster, this appears to be the best.
D. The ABC Strategy.
In the past, some agencies have undertaken an A,B,C strategy, i.e., 
they provide emergency shelter, temporary housing, then permanent housing. 
Some agencies have gone the shorter but still costly route of A,C or B,C. 
These are obviously wasteful unless the materials and skills contributed 
at the first stage contribute significantly to the final "C" stage.
II. Review of Appr .aes to Emergency Shelter and Post-Disaster Housing
Once an agency has adopted a particular strategy, it then selects a 
particular approach to carrying out that strategy. In terms of the structures 
that are eventually provided to disaster victims, one or more of the following 
approaches is usually carried out.
A. Tents.
Of all emergency shelter types, tents are the least damaging to inter­
ject on a disaster situation, but contribute the least to reconstruction 
and permanent development. The provision of tents has not been found to be 
completely disruptive, whether provided by local institutions or outside 
intervenors. Tents, however, rarely serve the needs of the refugee or 
disaster victim, and, in many cases are not appropriate to the climate to 
which they have been sent.
Among the major problems of tents are:
1. They fail to fulfill many shelter functions. They are 
especially poor for storage of salvaged goods and belongings.
2. They are too small and cannot be expanded.
3. They may be more expensive than a new house made of local 
materials.
Tents are often viewed by relief officials as being superior to more 
permanent units because they will deteriorate and, thus, not become instant 
slum houses. There are three things wrong with this argument. First, from 
the standpoint of the victims, the gradual disintegration is a continual source 
of misery. Second, the argument points out the lack of knowledge of the factors 
that create slums and slum housing. Slums are rarely created by the housing units 
themselves; they may be a contributing factor to the poor appearance of a 
neighborhood, but rarely are they the cause. Furthermore, disasters normally 
affect and deplete the housing supply in slums more than higher income 
neighborhoods within an urban area. The provision of an emergency shelter 
unit into this environment will hardly be a contributing factor to creating 
something which had already existed before the disaster. Third, the argument 
points to the fact that agencies have not adequately reviewed their past 
actions in the shelter and housing field. The evidence indicates that most
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agencies that have provided tents have also provided housing assistance.
In almost every case, the assistance is provided at the same location that the 
emergency shelter units were provided.
The major negative factor, however, relating to tents is the fact that 
they are not a contributor to long-term stability. Their distribution requires 
time and effort and commands resources which are already scarce following a 
disaster. It is a high price to pay for a commodity that does not assist 
permanent reconstruction.
B. Imported Designs and Units.
In the past ten years, there has been a general quest for a universally 
applicable emergency shelter unit which would meet the temporary shelter and 
housing needs of the victims in all areas of the developing countries. Members 
of the design profession, voluntary agencies, industry, and many university 
graduate programs have been active in this research. Hundreds of designs have 
been offered, many have gone into limiucu production, and a few have actually 
been shipped to disaster areas for use. The majority of these units have 
been designed to take advantage of simplified construction processes, for example, 
prefabrication, or to make use of new materials developed for use in the 
industrialized nations.
A survey of the success of these units has indicated that their use 
as emergency shelter units or as temporary housing has been extremely limited, 
and their performance and acceptability has been very poor. In examining 
the design criteria by the user agencies and governments which commission these 
designs, it is clear that the designer is responding to criteria developed 
by the relief agencies and intervenors, not by the victims themselves. While 
the agency may wish to have a low-cost unit that can be easily airlifted 
and rapidly installed, the refugee himself may wish to have a unit which is 
climatically suitable, easy to maintain, and provides storage for such things 
as his animals. Even in the cases where the housing unit itself may be 
culturally acceptable, mass production of hundreds of the same units may make 
it undesirable.
Another major problem is that often the agencies concentrate so much 
on developing a perfect housing unit that the obvious need for sites and services 
programs to accompany the housing units are neglected. A review of the major 
housing programs offered after disasters in the last ten years in which the 
houses go mainly unoccupied indicates that the housing units were set up 
without any consideration of the siting nor the services to accompany the 
housing units.
There are, of course, instances where industrialized-style housing 
has been both appropriate and quite popular. In fact, there seems to be a 
growing trend for low-income people in the developing countries to demand 
such housing, especially low-income persons dwelling within large metropolitan 
areas. This demand, as well as the rising expectations of the urban poor, 
must be taken into account when planning temporary housing or emergency shelter 
programs. In recent relief operations, a number of these units were introduced 
in limited quantities, but were quickly discontinued due to the lack of funds. 
Their presence in the community, however, increased the expectation of those 
who did not receive the units, and when other solutions to the housing problems 
were offered, which used indigenous materials, there was great resentment on 
Che part of those not receiving the "hetter" units and much animosity toward
6
the government arose.
C. Designs Incorporating Indigenous Materials.
In recent years, there has Been much interest in the development of 
designs for emergency shelter units which incorporate indigenous materials.
In the last several years, a number of groups have attempted to design and build 
shelters incorporating bamboo, wood, palm, reeds, adobe, and other materials 
which are typically used in the construction of houses in the third world. The 
majority of the effort has centered on developing designs which incorporate 
these materials and to make better use of the materials structurally, thereby 
improving their performance in adverse climatic conditions. (This is the 
approach taken by the Carnegie-Mellon/INTERTECT refugee housing team in their 
initial efforts in Bangladesh.)
While there is little doubt that the structural performance of the units 
is greatly improved over traditional units incorporating the same materials, 
the majority of these programs have still been unacceptable tc :he local 
people or to the agencies which have funded the projects. There are two 
major problems. The first is that to incorporate structural improvements 
utilizing these materials often increases the amount of materials that are 
required, thus making the unit more costly(even though the units may be less 
costly than units that use industrialized materials). The second factor is 
that the units often have different shapes and forms than the structures which 
are found locally or which the victims aspire to. (This was a major factor in 
a cultural rejection of the Carnegie—Mellon units in Bangladesh.) Again, these 
problems represent a failure of the designer in adequately defining the problem 
from the viewpoint of the disaster victim. Experience has shown that to utilize 
this approach, the design process must include the disaster victims and the 
supporting or assisting agencies as well as the designer.
There are two additional problems which limit the agencies from utilizing 
this approach. First, very few relief agencies have qualified housing specialists 
which are familiar with the capabilities, potentialities, and problems of using 
indigenous materials. For example, if an agency decides to utilize bamboo, 
it must not only know how best to use the bamboo structurally but must know 
such things as the proper time to cut the bamboo, how to recognize whether 
or not it has been cured properly, how to treat the bamboo for different 
climatic conditions, and what materials to use with the bamboo so that damaging 
insects are not attracted to the structure. The use of indigenous materials 
is a sophisticated process and, because the agencies themselves are not familiar
the process, many program planners will avoid using the materials.
A second reason why many agencies have recently decided to avoid the use of 
indigenous materials is that they are afraid of depleting the raw materials 
within t-^ie country. With the growing concern for the environment and the 
environmental impact of large scale depletion of raw material resources, agencies 
have become concerned that without adequate information on the ecological 
impact of using these materials, they may cause long-term harm in order to obtain 
a short-term benefit. It is thus mandatory that agencies undertaking this type 
of program approach must be able to obtain accurate information on the potential 
impact of their program. Unfortunately, little such information is usually 
available within the developing countries.
D. Materials Distribution
Many agencies have felt that the design process itself is something that
7
can be omitted in the provision of emergency shelter and permanent housing.
These agencies feel that the key to providing better housing is to provide 
adequate or improved construction materials. In some instances, the approach of 
simply providing construction materials is intended only to replace the same 
type of housing which has been destroyed by the disaster, but more recently, 
relief operations in such countries as Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua, 
lightweight roofing materials were introduced in hopes that this would make 
the structures less susceptible to earthquake damage. Many agencies consider 
this to be the best approach to self-help housing and remain aloof from the 
design process altogether. Other agencies, however, have not only provided 
the construction materials, but have undertaken extensive housing education 
efforts, concentrating on improvement, of building skills within the community 
and improvement of the housing units’ performance through structural improvement. 
Use of this educational approach has only occurred recently, and the results 
are not yet clear as to the relative success.
There appears to be only two major problems with the materials distri­
bution approach. First, in those cases where the material being distributed 
is not a local material nor one that is maufactured within the country, large-scale 
distribution and introduction of the material into the building practice may 
create a demand which cannot be met after the relief and reconstruction op­
erations cease. While the initial materials may have been provided^free or at 
a low cost, the materials necessary to maintain the unit or repair it may not 
be available. Second, the introduction of the material may necessitate changes 
in the basic design of the unit, and while the unit may be strengthened in one 
area, unless proper attention is given to all the details, it may be weakened 
in others.
E. Core Housing.
A new approach which has been employed recently in Guatemala is the 
development of the core house concept. In this approach, a relief agency 
provides a simple, low-cost frame which can be used as an emergency shelter 
or temporary structure. The frame and the roof are designed to be permanent, 
and, over a period of years, the occupants can then infill the walls with 
whatever materials are available to make a more permanent and formal structure.
This approach was utilized by CARE in Guatemala with varying degrees of success, 
depending upon the area in which the program was conducted and the extent i_o ^ 
which accompanying education programs were utilized along with the construction 
of the core. It is too early to tell whether or not this approach will have 
long-term desired results.
Methodology
On the basis of a review of the strategies and approaches employed by 
intervenors, the Carnegie—Mellon/INTERTECT team has reached several conclusions 
relating to the development of the methodology called for in the contract.
A. The best way to affect better emergency shelter and post­
disaster housing programs is to work with the disaster- 
prone country to develop strategies and approaches before 
the disaster occurs.
B. The only way an outside agency can be effective in the post­
disaster period is to be familiar with, and, if possible, 
have been active in the housing process before the disaster
occurs.
C. The best policy for the government to undertake in the provision 
of shelter or housing after a disaster is to select an approach 
and make that approach mandatory for all intervenors.
The Carnegie-Mellon/INTERTECT team feels that the best strategy 
to employ following a housing-depleting natural disaster is that of 
encouraging rapid reconstruction of permanent housing and omitting, unless 
there is a real threat to life from environmental exposure, the emergency housing 
stage.
The Carnegie-Mellon/INTERTECT team feels that the best approach to 
be employed in the rapid reconstruction of permanent housing is one which 
utilizes both materials distribution and education. In this approach, an 
intervenor selects a disaster-prone area. It then conducts an evaluation 
of potential risks to a community for a disaster and analyzes the structures 
to determine whether or not they would be vulnerable to that type of disaster. 
If the structures appear to be vulnerable, an analysis of the structures 
is made to determine whether or not the existing type of structure could be 
stabilized or structurally improved, and if so, several model structures 
are developed with the participation of the residents. In the development 
of the model structures, the comments and criticisms of the potential oc­
cupants are incorporated into the design and into future models. It is the 
role of the intervenor to serve as structural analyst and make sure that the 
designs which are being prepared are structurally suitable as well as cul­
turally and economically acceptable.
Following the development of the basic models which are intended to 
be used after a disaster, suitable educational materials, construction aids, 
and training materials are developed, and as soon as the training aids are 
ready, a number of model houses are built throughout the potential disaster 
area. During the construction of these model houses, the educational 
materials are employed and, thereby, receive a field shakedown, which, in 
turn, leads to their final form. Following the construction of the models, 
the training materials are produced in sufficient quantities and placed 
within the communities. (The intervenor may wish to incorporate the housing 
designs in normal housing programs and may actively promote the use of the 
model or design in the community before a disaster occurs. In any event, 
sufficient quantities should be available for retrieval after a disaster, 
even if the units are being promoted before a disaster occurs.)
IV. Case Study
During the coming year, the Carnegie-Mellon/INTERTECT team will conduct 
a case study^utilizing the approach recommended above. This approach is 
currently being explored by the Peruvian government through its Ministry of 
Housing. In addition, several voluntary agencies have also expressed an in­
terest in participating in the process of developing this approach and 
strategy. The CMU team is exploring the possibility of working with the 
Peruvians and the voluntary agencies in sharing ideas, materials, and in­
formation in the development of these strategies and.approaches. Currently, 
the Ministry of Housing has already developed a design for a unit which they 
wish to test and have asked the team to assist in the preparation of the 
training materials and the development of strategies wherein a housing program 
can be instituted rapidly following a disaster. Appendix B provides an outline 
of a proposed work program for the coming year. The team views this as an
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opportunity, not only to exchange information with counterparts in Peru, 
but also to analyze the validity of this strategy and approach and to identify 
some of the problems that will occur if it is employed in other countries. In 
particular, the team is interested in the following areas:
A. Developing approaches for reviewing the housing types and 
determining vulnerability.
B. Reviewing and identifying the key elements of the local 
housing process which must be considered in developing 
prototypes and models.
C. Identifying problems in the host country's ability to 
respond and seeing how once these problem areas are iden­
tified, how the host country approaches the elimination of 
these problems.
D. Assisting in the developing of the materiel requirements 
for conducting large-scale disaster housing programs and 
developing procedures wherein the impact of the rapid ac­
quisition of this mass material can be evaluated.
E. Participation in the preparation of the initial training aids.
The team has gathered much information during the last year 
on how to present information necessary to affect changes
in construction and to improve construction skills and is 
interested in working with counterparts in Peru to determine 
if these techniques will be cross-culturally useful.
Upon the completion of the case study, the team will prepare a series 
of recommendations on how to carry out this strategy in other areas and 
outline the procedures by which missions can develop this approach in their 
assigned area. These recommendations and procedures will include an outline 
of the training requirements that are necessary at all levels of the relief 
system (mission level, voluntary agencies, host country, etc.).
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APPENDIX A
CURRENT STUDIES ON THE TOPIC OF EMERGENCY SHELTER
I. Title: Development of an Approach and Prototype Emergency Shelters
Organizations: Camegie-Mellon University, INTERTECT
Funded by: USAID
Project Director: Volker Hartkopf, CMU
Address: Advanced Building Studies
Carnegie Mellon University 
Pittsburgh, Pa. 15213 
Phone: (412) 621-2600, ext. 8889
Comments: Team working to develop improved strategies and approaches for
governments and voluntary agencies in providing emergency shelter 
and post-disaster housing. Work also included development of 
model structures (prototypes) derived through the process and 
based on the use of local materials and technology consistent 
to the region.
Publications: "Post-Disaster Shelter/Housing: The State of the Art"
"Resources and Needs for Post-Disaster Shelter and Housing" 
"Report: Feasability Test of an Approach and Prototype
for Ultra Low-Cost Housing (Bangladesh, 1975)"
"Evaluation of the CMU/INTERTECT A-frame as Emergency Shelter 
in Bangladesh"
"Issues Related to the Provision of Emergency Shelter in 
Winter Conditions"
"Issues Related to the Provision of Emergency Shelter in 
Drought Relief Situations"
II. Title: Emergency Shelters Study, Phase I
Principal Consultants: Cuny, Frederick C., INTERTECT: Davis, Ian R., Oxford
Polytechnic; Krimgold, Frederick, MIT 
Funded by: United Nations Disaster Relief Office (Geneva)
Project Co-ordinator: Davis, Ian, Oxford Polytechnic
Address: Mr. Jean Paul Levy
UNDRO
Palais des Nations 
CH-1211 Geneva 10,
Switzerland
Comments: Comprehensive review of the role of emergency shelters, performance
of shelters in various types of relief situations, and examination 
of cost-benefit of shelters. Study looks at long term impact 
of shelter policies and has conducted case studies on the impact 
and success of shelter programs in relation to development in 
the affected country. Phase II will explore policies and roles 
for the UN, other intergovernmental organizations, as well as local 
governments.
Publications: There are nine volumes of supporting data, case studies,
and reports which are available.
III. Title: Role of Emergency Shelter in Developing Countries
Organization: Royal College of Art (U.K.)
Funded by: Overseas Development Ministry, U.K.
Project Directors: Kenneth Agnew, Gillian Patterson, RCA
Address: Dept, of Design Research
Royal College of Art 
Kensington Gore 
London SW7 2EU
Comments: Study commissioned to examine current provision and future
needs for emergency shelter. Team concentrated on developing 
design criteria for a universally applicable shelter made of 
fibreboard which could be made in the United Kingdom and 
shipped overseas. Project terminated at end of Phase I by 
ODM, April, 1977.
Publication: Current Provision and Future Needs for Disaster Emergency
Shelter, Final Report for Phase I, March, 1977. (RCA Report 
188.2)
IV. Title: Role of Technology in International Disaster Assistance
Organizations: Committee on International Disaster Assistance (CIDA)
Funded by: National Academy of Science, USAID
Executive Secretary: Charles Fritz, NAS (Emergency Shelter Working Group
Chairman: Frederick Krimgold, MIT)
Address: 2101 Constitution Ave. N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20418 
Telephone: (202) 389-6470
Comments: Committee formed by NAS at request of USAID to explore role and
future directions of AID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 
COFDA), especially in relation to science and technology. A 
working group was created by CIDA to examine emergency shelters 
and their provision by OFDA.
Publications: Proceedings of the meetings will be published in June, 1977.
: A report by the emergency shelters working group will be
published in June, 1977.
: A paper by Ian Davis of Oxford Polytechnic, submitted to
CIDA on emergency shelters will be published at the completion 
of the project.
V. Title: Seminar on Emergency Housing and Shelter
Organizations: Disasters Emergency Committee (of British voluntary agencies)
Funded by: Disaster Unit, Ministry of Overseas Development
Seminar Chairman: Leslie Kirkley (D.E.C.)
Address: 9 Grosvenor Crescent
London SWIX 7EJ
Publications: Report of a Seminar on Emergency Housing and Shelter, Jan. 15, 1976
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Interdisciplinary Working Party 
Camegie-Mellon University 
Pittsburgh, Pa., 15213 
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H. Goodspeed Volker H. Hartkopf
‘rofassor, Department of Assoc. Professor, Department
.gineering, CMU Architecture, CMU
Director, Advanced Building 
Studies, CMU
Consultant
Frederick C. Cuny 
Partner-in-Charge 
INTERTECT 
Dallas, Texas
The two-year evaluation of the emergency shelter was conducted 
by Everett Ressler. This report was written with the assistance 
of Carolyn Weisner.
I. Introduction
The following is a report to the Agency for International 
Development on the two-year evaluation of the CMU/Intertect refugee 
shelter field test in Bangladesh. The test shelters were built 
during Spring, 1975, and revisited during Spring, 1977. For an 
account of the testing program, please refer to the F^asibility 
Test of an Approach and Prototype for Ultra Low Cost Housing,
Final Report to the Agency for International Development, ARC:301.54, 
G655; TA/OST 75-26.
II. History of the Project
In 1973 an interdisciplinary team of architects, engineers, 
planners, and sociologists was formed at Camegie-Mellon University 
in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, to develop shelters for emergency use in 
developing countries. The team consisted of professionals from 
Camegie-Mellon and from Intertect in Dallas, Texas.
Beginning in Fall, 1973, several prototypical shelters were 
developed and tested in the Camegie-Mellon laboratory and in the 
jungles in Guatemala. Materials used were bamboo, wood, juterope, 
grasses and palm leaves, and stabilized soil.
Simultaneously, interdisciplinary courses were conducted in 
Emergency Habitat. Students submitted two entries to the 1975 
competition for the UNESCO Prize held in conjunction with the XII 
World Congress of the International Union of Architects, Madrid,
Spain, and received the Prize of the Soviet Union.
During Spring, 1975, under contract from the Agency for 
International Development (A.I.D.), U.S. Department of State,
(contract no. AID/ta-C-1174) tests of the A-frame were conducted 
under actual field conditions in Bangladesh. Several test sites 
and programs were chosen. They were:
— Rehabilitation of a section of Mirpur
— Prototype for construction for Demra
— Prototype for Tongi
— Village of Kunda, Comilla District
In June, 1975, Dr. Vijai Singh, a sociologist from the University 
of Pittsburgh, visited a number of the test sites to evaluate the 
cultural acceptability of the units in their various roles and to re­
port on their status several months after occupancy. Details of the 
testing program and of this preliminary evaluation are provided in the 
Feasibility Test of an Approach and Prototype for Ultra Low Cost Housing 
cited above.
In June, 1976, A.I.D. granted a new contract to the CMU/Intertect 
team (contract no. AID/ta-C-1345). One phase provided funds for a 
two-year evaluation of the project in Bangladesh in Spring, 1977.
The following sections discuss the findings of this evaluation.
2III. Two-Year Evaluation of CMU/Intertect A-Frames as Emergency Shelter 
in Bangaldesh
General Impressions
The status, or general condition, of the people living in the 
relief camps is difficult to describe or analyze. The first impression 
was very positive. The camps (Mirpur, Demra and Tongi) all had a 
feeling of life and vitality, best characterized by activity.
The camps appeared orderly and clean. The small, self-constructed 
minimal shelters, that characterized the camps initially, have almost 
entirely been replaced with housing units provided by international 
donors and the Government of Bangladesh.
There appeared to be an expanding number of shops and markets 
in each camp, producing and selling a wide variety of utilitarian 
items. This atmosphere may reflect the reportedly improved economic 
condition of Bangladesh.
Impressions of the residents in the camps were also positive. The 
children appeared well cared for and happy. Many are attending school. 
The women were actively involved in activities, and many men reportedly 
were working in Dacca.
Status of Camps
The status of Mirpur, Section XVI, remains as uncertain as it 
has for the last several years, with frequent rumors that it is to be 
moved immediately. In general, however, the orientation of the 
Government seems to be the acceptance of bustee camps as permanent 
residential areas; and they are reported to have granted land holdings 
to some residents.
Since the 1974 repatriation by Pakistan, there has been no 
further major repatriation of the Bihari people. The stance of the 
Bangladesh Government towards the Bihari people appears to be changing 
with an increasing acceptance. There is reportedly a movement to 
give back houses to the Bihari people and to grant them land.
The camps are still generally administered by camp committees and 
relief agencies. The Mennonite Central Committee, who held respon­
sibility for the Mirpur camp, has turned over all responsibility to the 
camp committee as of February 1, 1977. The camp committees appear, 
however, to be quite tenuous and very political.
Background
The first block of the CMU/INTERTECT houses were completed in May 
1975, and from the date of completion the shelters have been completely 
occupied. It is from this perspective of time and nearly two years’ use 
by the residents that information about these shelters is collected.
3A. Observations of Use
1. Care of the Structures by Occupants:
A general inspection revealed the units to be in good condition.
There is no evidence of abuse. The inside was, without exception, 
clean and well cared for.
The structural component which showed the most wear was the door.
Doors were often patched and reinforced. These repairs are indi­
cative of personal input into maintenance.
The ropes used as cross-braces were often very loose but were intact. 
There was no evidence of the cannibalization of any part of the 
structure.
2. Occupancy:
The occupancy rate appears to have remained about constant with 
three-to-five families per unit. There were several exceptions 
where units had been taken over largely by one family. There existed 
an obvious orientation for family units of the same family grouping 
to be living in the same shelter. This appeared to be positive.
3. Modifications:
No modifications to the main structure were noted, nor have there 
been any real alterations of entrance„ windows, ventilation systems 
or storage areas. (The comment most often heard regarding any 
modifications was an affirmation of how poor the family was.)
The most significant changes are the additions being made to the 
A-frames. The common courtyard, designed for a garden, has in part 
been taken over by family enclosures built around the doors of the 
units. This addition, common to all types of structures in the 
camps, is a fence or barrier which is built to provide a small, 
protected area through which one must pass to reach the door.
Within these enclosures, small bamboo structures are being erected 
and used as living quarters.
4. Problems:
The major disadvantage of the A-frames is the floor space lost because 
of the shape, which is significant in such a small living area.
The problem with using this space for storage is that materials stored 
at ground level are more likely to be damaged by rats and rain.
5. Impact of Design:
No evidence was seen that would indicate any incorporation of the 
principles of triangulation used in the A-frames, or of the venti-
lation systems used, in any other structures built in the area. All 
structures in the vicinity of the A-frames —  even those adjacent 
which were damaged by the wind storm of November 1976 —  were 
rectangular and conventionally built. All additions built wichin 
the enclosures (as described in ”C” above) were rectangular and conven­
tional.
In Demra, the Mennonite Central Committee has been using an A-frame 
for a family planning clinic. When a second building was needed, 
a traditional bamboo building was constructed. Although the A-irame 
in use was defended as strong, useful and cool, the traditional i.ype 
was built because ’’permanence was needed and the traditional type 
was cheaper”. This conclusion was often heard.
The one example of carry-over of the design was seen in Demra where 
A—frames were built; but the original design of tne CMU/INTERTECT 
team was significantly modified. The units were designed to be 
two-family units, and the doors were moved from the sides to the ends. 
Windows were eliminated. The roof was constructed of bamboo mai_s and 
plastic, and the amount of bamboo was reduced. Tne cost was much more 
comparable with that of conventional bamboo shelters. The design was 
changed because the CMU/INTERTECT structures were considered too com­
plex, more costly, and they required much closer supervision during 
construction. The modified structures were quite dilapidated and had 
the following overt problems. In the first place, the November 1976 
winds had torn off the ventilation flaps and some had not been 
replaced. In one, the peak had been rounded which prevents any 
ventilation. Secondly, the main structural poles had sheared off at 
ground level during the wind. Finally the shelters were hotter and 
darker than those provided by the CMU/INTERTECT Refugee Housing Team.
In general, this use (or mis-use) of triangulation provided very 
poor shelters.
B. Acceptability
The acceptability of the structures is evidenced both through preferences 
verbalized by the occupants and through observations of use.^ As had been 
described, the shelters appear to be both occupied and cared for. From a 
cursory examination, there appears to be no negative social stigma associated 
with them. One indication of this is the fact that one of the adminis­
trators of a family planning unit lives with his family in one of the 
units. They have fenced in an enclosure, added a small separate building 
for sleeping, installed electric lights, and have made it quite an 
exceptional place.
The comment most often heard from the residents is that they would 
prefer a house like the other commonly built structures within the camp.
The reason for this indicated preference may, however, involve more than 
preference for a particular shape of house. Other variables may include 
the amount of usable floor space, privacy within the structure, and degree
of autonomy from one’s neighbors. Individual shelters are probably 
preferred over semi-detached and more certainly over multi-family units. 
There is no question, however, that the residents prefer a more con­
ventional structure (brick is preferred). More study would be required 
to analyze this in detail.
Construction Detail
The shelters built as designed by the CMU/INTERTECT team appear to 
have been well constructed.
Frame: The frames appear in good shape with no splitting or
undue sagging.
Bindings: Joints were checked and the bindings were found to
be quite secure. In fact, no loose Dindings were found.
Floor: The raised bamboo floor and the mud plintn iloor ootn
appeared to be in spod shape with no obvious faults.
Roofing: The roofing is without question the most problematic
component. In the houses where only bamboo shingles were used 
for roofing, there were complaints of leakage. The use of plastic 
between bamboo panels seems to have eliminated the leaks, but con­
sequently has made the shelter much hotter, as it prevents air 
from circulating through the thatch.
Another problem evidenced with the use of plastic sandwiched be­
tween bamboo mats is that the plastic tended to slide down the 
roof. This was seen several times.
It was also interesting to note that bamboo was often slightly torn 
away from the part of the roof on either side of the entrance, 
near ground level. It was noticed only on the roofs made with 
bamboo and plastic.
Doors: The doors were certainly the most used components and
consequently showed the most wear. Often the bamboo had come apart 
or the hinge arrangement broken. Some doors were reinforced and 
some replaced with cloth.
Windows or Ventilation Flans: They appeared in good order.
Design for Wind Resistance: The A-frames were designed to be^
wind resistant. There is general acceptance that the design is 
an improvement over the typical bamboo structures, but field 
experience has provided little information of limits. The only 
significant encounter with the wind occurred in November, 1976.
The wind strength was enough to damage large bamboo roof sections 
but did little other damage. No damage was sustained by the A-frames 
at that time.
6IV. ^.i^tions by Voluntary Agencies
frvr npmra a more conventional structure 
uas S K E C T ^ er’a .  th. following analysis was
presented:
. q11„ rlpcided to use the conventional pitched-It was eventually deci _ able floor space
roof design since, cost elTJS A-frame. A-frames were 
was much higher than tha o d impiy resulting
very difficult to ventilate cheaply anc shelters
in their being stuffy and hot, whale c and
enabled an air stream to P «  ^ 1 had a str0nger
the roofs It was conceded ^  q£ a
structural form, destroy a cotlventional shelter counter- 
storm sulficxent^o ^onVentional type was far more
oalanced this. Also, ate a more normalpopular with occupants and helped create a
Bangladesh environment.
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7The cost factor of the A-frames is a major consideration at field 
level. If the cost of these units is compared with the cost of brick 
shelters, then the units are a bargain. But field workers do comparisons 
between the least expensive options, and in this case they are much 
more expensive than the conventional shelters preferred by the occupants.
VI. Lessons Learned From Bangladesh Field Test
In conclusion, the following categories represent a summary of the 
lessons learned through the field test and the 2—year evaluation.
A. Context:
The field work in Bangladesh underscores the need for a specific response 
appropriate to each encountered situation, instead of universally fitting 
prototypes based on geographical and cultural considerations. Even within 
a single geographic and cultural region, conditions vary enough to cause 
significant design modifications from one relief situation to another.
The original design was conceived to answer a situation like the one created 
by the massive influx of refugees into India during the 1971 War of 
Independence in East Pakistan.
Information the team obtained from relief organizations active in Bangladesh 
during 1972—75 indicated that the then prevailing situation, affecting 
large numbers of people, was virtually the same as the one encountered in 
India in 1971. As a result the team designed a structure to respond to 
those conditions. The field tests demonstrated, however, that conditions 
were in fact quite different in the encountered situations. Instead of 
being short term they were long term if not permanent. The major 
participants, the donors and the displacees, did not agree concerning 
the permanency of the camps. Relief organizations insisted the camps 
to be temoorary, whereas the displacees have accommodated themselves 
for long term occupancy. As a result a structure was designed which 
was largely inappropriate. The relief agencies, not wanting to encourage 
permanency, considered the structures' strength and durability too 
permanent and costly. The occupants, on the other hand, knowing that the 
situation would be long term, complained about lack of space and 
privacy. This brings out three major points: 123
1. The design process must originate in the field.
2. Specific Designs cannot be transferred from situation 
to situation.
3. The original CMU/INTERTECT design concept and process 
remains untested.
B. Approach:
1. The design process must originate in the field. It is impossible 
for the designers to be completely aware of all the constraints 
unless they are on site and comprehend fully both the operational 
constraints and the local housing process.
Among the issues which the designers must take into consideration 
are how structures are built and what building skills are used 
locally, who participates in the building process, and how space 
is organized and allocated.
2. The process must involve from the outset all participants, including the 
victims and intervenors, which are donors and designers.
3. Critical constraints, particularly trade offs of desired perfor­
mance and associated costs.must be established jointly. Critical 
cost levels, below which the safety of the future occupants can­
not be guaranteed must be understood.
4. The final selection of suitable materials, components and layouts 
among the developed alternatives must rest with the future inhab­
itants .
5. Before beginning full scale construction, it is desirable to con­
duct small scale demonstration projects wherein occupants are 
provided with a range of options in order to select the most applicable
design.
C. Structures:
The most important factor in developing designs acceptable to future 
occupants is cultural acceptability. This, in turn, depends largely on 
two major points:
1. The amount of useable space allotted per family and
2. The degree of resemblance to traditional forms the designs 
achieve.
Therefore, the designer must begin with indigenous designs and/or forms 
and analyze their appropriateness for the situation at hand. Should the 
indigenous structures exhibit deficiences, modifications which improve 
performance (i.e. structural strength, suitability for mass construction, 
etc.) must be incorporated. To reiterate: the intervener must begin with
what already exists. Any modification must achieve utmost simplicity.
D. Sites and Services:
Sites and service considerations (layout, provisions of water, sanitation 
and services) are as important as the design of individual units. It 
can safely be argued that the quality of a camp environment is as de­
pendent on sites and services provided as on the designs of individual 
units.
E. Construction Process:
Methods chosen to train the construction teams did not prove effective in 
transferring the technology. More information must be developed on how to 
teach, how to transfer technology and how to present the information. (The 
team is addressing this area under the present contract.)
9F. Operational Needs:
The experience indicates that the majority of agencies conducting housing 
projects are not fully cognizant of the differences in constraints im­
posed in different relief situations. This points to the need to assist 
agencies in assessing needs and constraints for each specific situation.
G. Spread effect:
The project demonstrates the failure of the concept of simply delivering 
materials and training aids to the disaster area and attaining a "spread 
effect." As stated earlier, the design process must begin on site and 
experience shows that trained personnel must be present continuously to 
promote new concepts or designs.
H. Timing:
The project underscored the importance of proper timing of construction.
In most developing countires there is a "building season," in other words, 
a time when material, capital, and labor, combine to facilitate construction. 
Rarely, does a disaster alter this time frame. Unless the disaster occurs 
at a time when exposure risk is a major threat, housing construction will 
not tend to override other concerns. In the Bangladesh Field Test, 
the best time for construction proved to be the two months before the 
monsoon (March, April). The best time to evaluate performance was during 
and immediately after the monsoon, and the most logical time to initiate 
the second phase of construction was March, April, the following year.
The team was unable to take advantage of these opportunities because 
of discontinuity in funding. In the future, to insure effectiveness, 
contracts must be structured to promote long-term continuity.
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Rehabilitation of 
Section of Mirpur 
Camp, Spring, 1975 
1. Conditions before 
rehabilition
2. Work in progress- 
Levelling of land
3. Erection of A-frames
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Signs of Use and Care 
of Entrances in Mirpur, 
Spring, 1977 
7. Apex of triangular 
door repaired
Danger of change to 
Structural Design 
10. Cross-bracing of 
A-frames during 
construction
11. Interior view of Mirpur multi-family unit
It appears that some of the cross bracing has 
been removed to increase useable space. This 
shows a lack of structural understanding on 
the part of the residents.
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Use of Outdoor Space 
Between CMU/I Structures 
at Mirpur
The layout of the reha­
bilitated section of 
the camp facilitated the 
structuring of a sequence 
of public and private 
spaces.
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Indigenous Village 
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house
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note angled bamboo 
posts meant to pre­
vent structure from 
leaning
20. Structural as well 
as roof damage as 
a result of storm
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In the last few years, natural disasters in Haiti, Nicaragua, Turkey, 
Iran, Bangladesh, Peru and Guatemala destroyed housing to such an extent 
that massive reconstruction programs were needed. Following each disaster, 
the respective national government, other governments, international agencies, 
local communities and other groups responded by initiating housing programs.
The goal of this paper is to briefly investigate where such programs 
acquired the technical information needed to formulate and implement post­
disaster housing programs, and to explore the need for and possible ways of 
improving this technical information flow.
Methodology
Guatemala was selected as a case study. Personal interview was the means 
of acquiring information about the flow of technical information. Interviews 
were conducted with personnel in housing programs of the Guatemalan Government, 
of official foreign aid, of voluntary agencies, and of religiously-affiliated 
groups. These discussions focused on a description of the housing programs; 
a review of what technical information sources had been used; the rationale 
for the technical decisions made; and what was felt to have been learned.
Findings
On February 4, 1976, a major earthquake in Guatemala destroyed over two 
hundred thousand houses. At least thirty agencies responded by setting up 
housing programs. Of the twenty-four major agencies, six were international 
charities, six were religiously-affiliated, six were representatives of other 
nations ( three governmental and three private), and six were locally-based 
groups.1
There was great diversity between these housing programs, including major 
differences such as the basic approach to housing, structural design, materials 
and methods.^ However, the purpose of this paper is not to evaluate these 
differences, but rather to investigate the basis on which such decisions were 
made.
There are many distinct facets to the need for, and use of, technical 
information in post—disaster housing programs. The findings of this study are 
grouped into the following categories: Information Users; Information Use; 
Information Flow; Information Type; and Information Sources.
1 Charlotte Thompson and Paul Thompson, Reconstruction of Housing in Guatemala: 
A Survey of Programs Proposed After the Earthquakes of February, 1976.
2 More specific details of these differences have been outlined in the study 
cited above.
I. Information Users (Program Personnel):
One of the most striking findings was that, generally, neither field nor 
administrative personnel working in the housing programs had technical back­
grounds or experience in housing. The most obvious reason for this was that 
people with experience in administering post-disaster housing programs virtually 
did not exist, so concerned people from other professions altruistically assumed 
the responsibility. In other cases, the selection of non-technical people 
seemed to stem from a misconception of some agencies that post-disaster housing 
is merely shelter which can be constructed in any form by anyone.
With the broad diversity of professions represented in program personnel 
came obviously useful skills, and the diligence with which they worked is 
commendable. The lack of experience in housing, however, highlighted the signi­
ficance and need for technical input.
Program personnel were quick to seek technical advisors, but often en­
countered difficulties in evaluating the highly contradictory technical opinions 
given (these will be discussed in further detail later). The need for such 
technical advisors arises out of the fact that housing is a specialized field. 
Housing programs in a post-disaster situation add many specifically different 
variables, and building in an earthquake-prone area demands still more very 
important considerations.
It should also be pointed out that only a very small percentage of the 
people interviewed had worked previously in a disaster situation or felt they 
might ever work in a disaster situation elsewhere. This indicates the lack 
of collective memory for building reconstruction programs on a base of past 
experience. It is also indicative of the problem of transfering what was 
learned in this disaster to people involved in other disaster situations.
II. Pattern of Information Use:
How technical information was used determined the pattern of when the 
information was needed.
A. Program Personnel:
Program administrators, congruent with the responsibility of assessing 
options and determining future programs, particularly sought information 
within the first three weeks after the disaster. This initial period 
was undoubtedly most significant for technical input. It was during 
this three-week period that damage was assessed, options for reconstruction 
programs considered, and in many cases initial program plans finalized 
and building materials ordered. Approximately 75% of the agencies inter­
viewed maintained the program conceived during the first three weeks.
The technical information needed by program administrators in this con­
ceptualization phase concerned options, and how such could be implemented. 
The administrator of a very large program suggested that, immediately 
post-disaster, model houses be built exemplifying all different building 
materials and techniques relevant to reconstruction programs, for the
purpose of providing program administrators with visual information upon 
which to base their decisions. Another form of this was the housing fair 
which was held in the capital city, consisting of the display of proto­
types of manufactured houses. Although these houses were not considered 
appropriate or economical for rural reconstruction programs, the fair 
itself (and the former suggestion) was a response to the need expressed 
by program administrators for information about options.
It was during the initial three-week conceptual phase that the lessons 
learned and carried forward from past experience were most useful. The 
removal or burial, by large earth-moving equipment, of post-earthquake 
rubble in Nicaragua was several times mentioned as both destructive and 
wasteful of valuable resources. With at least one known agency, the 
information from the Nicaraguan experience was the deterrent to the use 
of large equipment in that way in Guatemala, thereby preventing a repeat 
of the same mistake.
Program administrators relied most heavily upon consultants and technical 
advisors also during this initial three-week period. Consultants and 
technical advisors, exploring options and alternatives for program plan­
ning, particularly sought information during the second and third weeks. 
Their greatest need was for information which was technical in nature.
The U.S. Embassy, viewed as a primary source of information, reported 
that the greatest volume of requests were received within this initial 
period and came predominantly from Guatemalan professionals seeking 
information about a specific problem. Examples include•requests for 
information about the stabilization of adobe and about building with 
ferrocement.
Field personnel directly involved in the building process viewed the need 
for technical information differently, from the perspective of functional 
problems. The technical information which they felt was needed was 
pragmatic, in a "how-to-build" form, and directly related to actual con­
struction problems and difficulties encountered in carrying out the 
building program. In other words, they considered technical information 
as a functional resource needed for the duration of the program. Short­
term technical consultations were very unacceptable. Field personnel 
felt the need was for a readily available technical resource person who 
would assist with the specific problems at hand, as they came up.
It should also be noted that the demands of the post-disaster situation 
were such that answers to technical questions were demanded almost as 
soon as the problem was recognized. Time delays were just not acceptable 
to personnel, administrative or field.
B. Technical Resource People (Consultants):
For both program administrators and field personnel, technical resource 
people were an important part of the technical information flow. They 
were generally architects and engineers, or students in those fields. 
They came from local technical firms, the university, from sponsoring 
agencies, from international consulting firms, as official aid represen­
tatives, and as independent individuals.
However, almost without exception, personnel at every level of the 
housing programs mentioned the confusion caused by differing technical 
recommendations. Consultants tended to work very autonomously. The 
only known, functional, interagency technical information sharing 
occurred during the first six weeks, through a weekly meeting of field 
level personnel which was sponsored by INTERTECT. The only interagency 
sharing of technical information at an administrative level occurred at 
the instigation of the National Reconstruction Committee, nine months 
after the disaster.
Although many of the consultants were respected professionals, very few 
had any experience in the mass production of housing in rural settings. 
Consultants often made recommendations based on their past experiences 
in large, urban areas or other cultural settings. Many examples were 
given of architectural designs for houses in western style, without 
consideration of culturally acceptable cooking facilities, or of siting 
and appearance preferences. The two most common problems were: the 
design of houses which were simply not within the economic range of the 
people, and consequently not appropriate; and the design of houses with­
out regard to earthquake resistant building principles.
Whether the consultants were local engineers, architects, university 
professors or international consultants, both administrative and field 
personnel concluded that useful consultants must be "functional"; that 
is, that they not only provide information on a "how-to" level, but also 
provide information congruent with the social and cultural values of the 
community. It was this ability to interpolate purely technical informa­
tion into the community setting which was felt to be most lacking and 
was most demanded of the consultant.
The system for selecting consultants was very informal. Program admin­
istrators preferred a consultant from within their organization, and 
they usually chose a consultant with whom they were personally acquainted. 
However, over h of the agencies interviewed had changed consultants —  
and basic elements of their housing programs —  within the first several 
months.
The most frequently received suggestion for ways to improve technical 
information delivery was the development of a roster of available con­
sultants with experience in post-disaster housing, who can^work effectively 
at a functional level. Experience was the most sought-after qualification.
III. Information Type and Sources (Printed):
The technical information most sought-after following the disaster was 
data concerning earthquakes; local building methods; how local building 
materials could be used in different ways; reports of experience in other 
areas, building with similar materials; and information about suitable and 
available options.
Within the first three weeks, the following materials are known to have 
been brought into Guatemala, reproduced, and distributed widely among agencies.
___ Design. Siting, and Construction of Low-Cost Housing.
and Community Buildings to Better Withstand Earthquakes 
and Windstorms was distributed by U.S.AID;
___Small Buildings in Earthquake Areas_ was distributed by
CARITAS and INTERTECT;
___ Manual for the Construction of Houses with Adobe (from
Peru) was distributed by U.S. AID and the National 
Emergency Committee;
___ Tu Puedes Reparar Tu Vivienda (from Mexico)^was distri­
buted by the Mexican Embassy, the National Emergency 
Committee, and through the four national newspapers;
___ Earthquakes and Small Structures was distributed by
CARITAS and OXEAM. ~
OXEAM was the only organization which be 
materials for reconstruction within the first 
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___ OXEAM, World Neighbors, and Save the Children Alliance
produced over 100,000 copies of different^construction 
manuals and teaching aids as supplements for training 
programs for builders;
___ CARITAS produced handouts on emergency shelter and the
repair of damaged houses, and a manual for building with
local materials;
___ CARE produced a manual on how to build an earthquake
resistant house;
___ The National Emergency Committee, with Educacion Basica
Rural, produced a series of nine leaflets on how to 
demolish, salvage and repair houses;
___ CEMAT compiled a manual on the techniques of building with
local materials in an earthquake zone,
___ An independent group of architects designed a small manual
on building techniques;
___ Save the Children Alliance produced a series of leaflets
on the repair and reinforcement of damaged houses.
Besides these general materials, each agency which designed a house 
produced materials describing that particular house. With the major exception 
of the materials developed by OXFAM, World Neighbors and Save the Children 
Alliance, much of the above listed materials were predominantly translations 
and adaptations of the five sets of materials brought in immediately after the 
disaster. This fact underlines the significance of the information which is 
distributed. The five original materials brought into Guatemala were general 
topic papers. Agency personnel needed to have the technical competence to 
extract, evaluate and interpolate this general information into specific 
recommendations for local materials and building practices.
The importance of the ability to analyze technical information was 
especially noted with the Manual for the Construction of Houses with Adobe.
This was circulated widely; however, it was reportedly written by a non­
technician and contains sketches of building techniques which structural 
engineers consider incorrect.
A. Technical Information:
In spite of the rather significant amount of printed materials produced, 
the personnel interviewed verbalized a lack of technical information. A 
common example was the confusion concerning the broadly differing opinions 
on the structural analysis of why adobe houses were destroyed. Was it 
because adobe is inherently weak? Or was it the way adobe was used as a 
building material? And should adobe be used in reconstruction? The 
decision of many groups to use a different building material such as 
concrete block, stemmed more from a lack of information about adobe and 
anti—seismic structures, than from a sound comparison of the different 
materials. Similar confusion centered on how to add a porch to a house 
while retaining the seismic—resistant integrity of the house.
These examples illustrate that, although some printed information was 
available and consultants existed with every program, practically 
speaking, there was a lack of knowledge about some very basic consider­
ations of the situation.
Other examples of necessary technical information included: wood pre­
servative alternatives; building code information (relevant to the local 
situation); information on the repair of damaged adobe structures; design 
recommendations for footings, wall thickness and roofing materials; ferro— 
cement; reinforcing for concrete; stabilization of adobe; and alternative 
building materials. At the time of the disaster, these information 
materials were not known to have existed in Guatemala.
B. Program Information:
Each program also had to determine an approach to housing, a method of 
construction, a technology of building, a speed for construction, siting 
considerations, building materials, cultural, suitability, costs and dis­
tribution. Each of these categories in turn included many individual 
considerations such as whether the program should provide housing for the 
people or enable people to provide housing for themselves; whether to
build temporary or permanent structures; whether building materials 
should be salvaged from the ruins, local building materials and techniques 
used, or whether building materials should be imported. Should the houses 
be sold or given without cost? Should a pre-designed house be offered or 
individual preferences be permitted? And again, one of the most important 
considerations in such an earthquake—prone area was whether the houses 
being built were structurally sound.
All of these considerations demanded a technical input integrated with 
non-technical factors. Past experience from other reconstruction programs 
may have been very useful in the determination of each variable. However, 
both administrators and field personnel always qualified the need for 
information by saying that the need was not simply for the purely technical 
information. It was felt that technical information was closely linked 
with social and cultural factors and must be understood from the perspective 
of the specific field situation. Seldom, if ever, was there a need for 
technical information about how to build an earthquake-resistant house 
independent of such considerations as what the owner wanted the house to 
look like; what materials the owner wanted to use in building his house; 
what building materials were available; how the living space was to be 
used; whether the house would be enlarged; and how the house was to be 
paid for. Examples include the lack of occupancy of emergency shelters 
which were considered unsatisfactory, and the refusal to adopt the technique 
of building with buttresses because it did not conform with the desired 
house appearance.
Just as technical information cannot be divorced from sociological con­
siderations in the local community, neither can technical, information be 
effectively utilized without close involvement with the personnel imple­
menting the program. Interviews with field personnel repeatedly revealed 
that coupled with any technical information came an equally great need 
for program information. This included planning, program design, training, 
logistics, personnel, and information for the many specific difficulties 
of the daily operations. Technical consultants were often heavily de­
pended upon for combining technical data with program information.
Conclusions
Technical information must be recognized as a specific and* unique com­
ponent of reconstruction programs. The assumption that the technical informa­
tion required is simple and readily available has not been proven true by 
experience, particularly if post-disaster housing is viewed from a develop­
mental perspective.
Improvement in the post—disaster flow of technical information must begin 
with the understanding that the information-sharing systems which operate in 
normal times do not meet the need. Not only is the disaster situation atypical, 
but the people requesting the information, the way the information is used, 
the time constraints, and the specific information required are all unique.
Technical information from a program perspective must be understood in 
a fragmented way:
A. Program Conception: Personnel who initiate post-disaster housing
programs have a distinct use of technical information, for which they 
depend on technical resource people. The information will be needed 
immediately following a disaster for a relatively short period of time.
It must include data relevant to all the factors pertaining to program 
implementation, including past experience.
B. Technical Design: Technical resource people involved as consultants
to any program will seek technical information in exploring options for 
specific problems. The people performing this function are the most 
likely to contact universities, international sources, etc.
C. Functional Problems: Technical resource people are specifically
needed to relate to the program implementation process. The information 
required is typically not highly technical data per se, but topical 
materials describing the processes.
But the effectiveness of every program increases with the orientation of 
sharing experience and evaluating new options.
Recommendations
I. Coordination:
The broad coordination of disaster programs has almost become standard 
procedure; so must the coordination of technical information. Immediately 
post-disaster, a center for technical information should be set up, and the 
following goals included:
A. Its primary goal should be to work in response to the needs of 
participating agency personnel;
B. It should function as an interagency forum where ideas and lessons 
learned can be shared;
C. It should serve as a technical back-up by channeling requests to 
the resource people available;
D. It should serve as a data bank, drawing in pertinent information 
and disseminating it as requested;
E. It must be set up with the active involvement of all housing pro­
grams and resource people.
II. Pre-Disaster Planning:
The official governments, international agencies and local groups which 
exist in disaster-prone areas must begin with pre—disaster planning. This
must include not simply preparation for a response to the emergency phase, but 
also analysis and planning for positive programming in reconstruction. This 
preparation must focus on the variables, study the options, and collect infor­
mation from what others have learned.
Pre-disaster planning begins with the objective evaluation of what has 
been learned in past experience; such evaluation should be a regularly scheduled 
part of every reconstruction program. This is especially important because of 
the short duration of reconstruction programs —  the people involved move on, 
and the lessons learned may be lost.
III. Data Bank:
There is an obvious need for an international data collection and dis­
semination center specifically oriented to technical information of use in 
post-disaster situations. The purpose must be to collect pertinent technical 
information and corresponding program information. Such a center must have 
the ability to furnish such information immediately in usable form.
The best use of such a data bank would include linkages to an in-country 
pre-disaster planning office or a post-disaster technical coordination unit. 
Suggestions for the provision of such a service have included the United Nations 
Disaster Relief Office, a university, or an independent technical resource 
service.
IV. Consultants:
Past experience in similar situations was one of the most common quali­
fications desired of consultants by agency personnel. It was recommended by 
several agencies that a roster of resource persons with experience and 
expertise be developed. With a better understanding of the needs, agencies 
may be able to provide better consultants.
V. Training:
The goal of every country is to be independent. Training indigenous 
personnel should be one of the key orientations for all consultants.
Post-disaster housing and the technical information provided must be 
oriented to providing houses from the perspective of community development 
rather than from that of temporary emergency response.
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Information
Sharing
THE CMU/INTERTECT INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM
Relief and development personnel, responding to natural and man-made 
disasters, receive little advance information concerning resource availability, 
skills and abilities of tbe people affected, and past approaches to relief/ 
reconstruction programs under similar conditions. As a result, each situation 
tends to be approached as a singular event, and very little information is 
transferred from case to case.
Carnegie-Mellon University, in conjunction with INTERTECT, is developing 
an Information Sharing System to facilitate the dissemination of information 
on pre-disaster planning and preparedness, disaster relief and reconstruction, 
and post-disaster technology. As a result of the expansion of disaster relief 
work and low-cost housing research and development, the need is vital for a 
systematic collection, storage and classification of materials produced. At 
present, there is no common storage and retrieval system in use, thus limiting 
the accessibility of information.
The main goal of the Information Sharing System is to aid field operations. 
To effectively accomplish this, there must be adequate feedback from field per 
sonnel. Communications from the field will not only enrich the system, but will 
also provide raw material for further research in response to field operation 
needs. To be most effective, research centers/individuals must stay informed 
about actual conditions in relief/reconstruction situations, problems unresolved, 
and approaches taken. In addition, the system is designed to facilitate ex­
change between research centers. Through these communication linkages, the 
system will stimulate more accurate reporting and exchange of ideas.
Field reports will be collected continuously to help the user evaluate the 
effectiveness of relief/reconstruction programs and in order to upgrade the 
quality of research. The library will contain not only material on the organi 
zation and administration of relief/reconstruction efforts, but also information 
concerning indigenous materials and cultures, local economies, and pnysical 
environments that relate to the daily problems of field work in developing 
countries.
Information will be stored in the form of books, articles, case studies, 
bibliographies, tapes and slide presentations, which will be cross-referenced 
by subject matter according to a list of key words which fall into twelve basic 
categories. The staff, aided by a group of professionals, will play an active 
role in evaluating the validity and relevance of the information received and 
disseminated. The information will be reviewed prior to storage, and responses 
will be actively tailored to try to meet the specific needs of the user.
The CMU/INTERTECT Information Sharing System is currently undergoing an 
internal testing process, and a key word list is being developed which can be 
adapted to any information file. By building a system that is easily accessible 
and actively evaluated, we hope to provide a common storage and retrieval sys­
tem for the use of field personnel, government and voluntary agencies, and 
research centers, which will handle local and international requests for infor­
mation quickly and efficiently.
Advanced Building Studies Program INTERTECT
Carnegie-Mellon University P.0. Box 10502
Schenley Park Dallas, Texas 75207
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15213
THE CMU/INTERTECT INFORMATION SHARING SYSTEM
General Classification of Subject Matter
01 Bibliographies
50 Pre-Disaster Planning
60 Disaster Preparedness
100 Administration
200 Environmental Control
300 Housing
400 Medical Care
500 Storage and Distribution
600 Transportation
700 Development
800 Regional Data
900 Ecology-
1000 Demography
1100 Appropriate Technology
1200 General Reference
